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In Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd.,1 Merck KGaA 
(Merck) sought protection under a statutory exemption2 from claims 
of patent infringement brought by Integra Lifesciences.3 The Supreme 
Court addressed whether the use of patented inventions during 
preclinical research infringed the patent-holders’ rights if the results 
were not submitted to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).4 
The Court held unanimously that a statutory safe-harbor provision 
contained in 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) “extend[ed] to all uses of patented 
inventions that are reasonably related to the development and 
submission of any information under the [Federal, Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act].”5 The Court’s interpretation of the safe-harbor 
provision broadened protection for those engaged in drug research at 
a substantial cost to patent-holders. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
In 1988, Merck began funding research conducted by Dr. David A. 
Cheresh at the Scripps Research Institute.6 Dr. Cheresh discovered 
that certain arginine-glycine-aspartate (RGD) peptides were an 
effective angiogenesis inhibiter. Angiogenesis, the process by which 
 
 * 2006 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law. 
 1. Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. ___ (2005); 125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005). 
 2. Hatch-Waxman Act, 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (1994). 
 3. Respondents and the Burnham Institute co-owned the patented material peptides. 
Merck, 125 S. Ct. at 2377. 
 4. Id. at 2376. 
 5. Id. at 2380 (citing Eli Lilly v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 665–69 (1990)). 
 6. Both the Scripps Institute and Dr. Cheresh were dismissed from the initial patent 
infringement suit. Id. 
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new blood vessels sprout from existing blood vessels,7 plays a critical 
role in the spread of disease.8 Dr. Cheresh succeeded in reversing 
tumor growth in chicken embryos by using RGD peptides that were 
patented by Integra but provided to him by Merck.9 
In 1995, Merck entered into an agreement with Dr. Cheresh and 
Scripps to fund further testing of the patented RGD peptides. The 
research was designed to identify the most promising candidate for 
submission of an investigational new drug (“IND”) application to the 
FDA; however, some of the research on patented peptides would not 
result in the submission of the IND application. From 1995 to 1998, 
Dr. Cheresh conducted experiments on the RGD peptides provided 
by Merck. 
Integra sought to license the patented RGD peptides to Merck 
until negotiations broke off in the spring of 1996.10 In November of 
that year, Merck began to push its peptides through the regulatory 
process, and it shared its research with the National Cancer Institute, 
which agreed to sponsor clinical trials.11 In July 1996, Integra sued 
Merck, Scripps, and Dr. Cheresh for patent infringement in the 
Southern District of California. Integra sought damages from Merck 
for providing the patented peptides and an injunction to stop both Dr. 
Cheresh and Scripps from using the patented peptides to conduct 
further angiogenesis research.12 Merck denied infringement and 
invoked protection under both Section 271(e)(1) and a common-law 
research exemption to patent infringement claims.13 
II.  BROADENING THE SAFE-HARBOR PROVISION OF SECTION 
271(E)(1) 
Section 271(e)(1) provides that “[i]t shall not be an act of 
infringement to . . . use . . . a patented invention . . . solely for uses 
 
 7. Id. at 2378. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 11. Merck, 125 S. Ct. at 2379. 
 12. Id. The suits against Dr. Cheresh and Scripps were dismissed by the District Court on 
post-trial motion. Id. at 2380. 
 13. Id. at 2379. The opinion is limited to discussion of Section 271(e)(1). The district court 
found that the common-law research exemption barred claims of infringement for pre-1995 
research, but questions of fact remained as to whether Section 271(e)(1) barred claims for post-
1995 research. 
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reasonably related to the development and submission of information 
under a Federal law which regulates the . . . use . . . of drugs.”14 
Although the Federal Circuit found that the Section 271(e)(1) safe 
harbor applied only to clinical testing that was absolutely necessary to 
supply required information to the FDA, the Supreme Court held that 
“[Section] 271(e)(1)’s exemption from infringement extends to all 
uses of patented inventions that are reasonably related to the 
development and submission of any information under the [Federal 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act].”15 
The Court concluded that Section 271(e)(1) “necessarily” included 
preclinical study of patented compounds as long as the studies were 
“appropriate” steps in preparing an IND application.16 The Court 
reasoned that limiting application to clinical trials would effectively 
limit application of the safe-harbor provision to submissions to the 
FDA of abbreviated new drug applications (ANDAs) for generic 
drugs already approved for market, because those would be the only 
drugs that could possibly already be in clinical trials.17 Such a limited 
reading of the statute was seemingly foreclosed by Eli Lilly & Co. v. 
Medtronic, Inc., in which the Supreme Court determined that Section 
271(e)(1) applied to all inventions, not drug-related inventions alone.18 
Despite its concession that Section 271(e)(1) applied to drugs in 
preclinical as well as clinical trials, Integra nevertheless argued that 
protection should not extend to preclinical studies relating to the 
drug’s efficacy, mechanism of action, or pharmacokinetics.19 In fact, 
Integra sought to narrow the safe-harbor provision to preclinical 
research to determine the safety of the drug in humans, arguing that 
safety is the only data the FDA is—or should be—interested in when 
 
 14. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1). 
 15. Merck, 125 S. Ct. at 2380 (citing Eli Lilly v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 665–69 
(1990)) (emphasis in original). 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 2383 (“Thus, to construe 271(e)(1), as the Court of Appeals did . . . is effectively 
to limit assurance of the exemption to the activities necessary to seek approval of a generic 
drug.”). 
 18. Eli Lilly v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 665 (1990); see also Tanuja V. Garde, 
Supporting Innovation in Targeted Treatments: Licenses of Right to NIH-Funded Research 
Tools, 11 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 249, 264 (2005) (stating that the Supreme Court 
possibly granted certiorari in Merck because the Federal Circuit’s limited construction of 
Section 271(e)(1) “arguably conflict[ed] with the Supreme Court’s decision in Eli Lilly & Co. v. 
Medtronic, Inc., which held that the statutory exemption is not limited to generic drugs but also 
covers medical devices”). 
 19. Merck, 125 S. Ct. at 2381. 
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an IND is submitted.20 The Supreme Court rejected these arguments, 
finding that though safety is the primary concern of the FDA, it is not 
its only concern.21 
III.  IMPACT AND CONCLUSION 
Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. broadened the 
application of Section 271(e)(1) with respect to: (i) the phase of the 
research, (ii) the scope of the research, and (iii) the result of the 
research. After Merck, the safe-harbor provision can be used to shield 
drug manufacturers from liability for (i) using patented materials 
both before and after clinical trials have been approved by the FDA, 
(ii) conducting research beyond issues pertaining to human safety, and 
(iii) failing to submit an IND to the FDA on research that used the 
patented compounds.22 The case reflected a pro-development and 
concomitant anti-property-right policy, acknowledging that in reality, 
scientific testing is a process of “trial and error,” and the safety of 
proposed clinical experiments cannot be evaluated “in a vacuum.”23 
Merck has already had an impact on pending patent litigation, and 
it is likely to affect the future of research exemptions. As a result of 
the decision, drug companies will be able to conduct research on 
patented inventions free from threat of liability for infringement 
reasonably related to submission to the FDA. In fact, some have 
suggested this will foster greater efficiency in the drug industry.24 
Aside from the effect Merck will have on pending patent litigation, 
the expansive scope of the new formulation reaches back to 
encompass the infant stages of research. As such, the decision in 
Merck weakens protection for so-called research tools, which are 
 
 20. Id. 
 21. Integra also argued that Merck should be denied protection under Section 271(e)(1) for 
failure to comply with FDA’s “good laboratory practices.” Id. at 2380. The Court rejected this 
argument, noting that “good laboratory practice” rules apply only to safety and not to 
preclinical studies of a drug’s efficacy. Id. Moreover, the Court stated that Merck’s non-
compliance with “good laboratory practice” would not necessarily preclude submission of an 
IND to the FDA. Id. 
 22. See, e.g., Dennis Crouch, Merck v. Integra: Supreme Court Reverses, Broadens Statutory 
Experimental Use Safe Harbor, PATENTLY-O: PATENT LAW BLOG, June 14, 2005; see also Yann 
Joly, Integra v. Merck: The Resurrection of the American Research Exemption?, CENTRE FOR 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY POLICY, June 2005, available at http://www.cipp.mcgill.ca/db/news/ 
00000025.pdf. 
 23. Merck, 125 S. Ct. at 2381. 
 24. Joly, supra note 22, at 3. 
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products or methods “whose purpose is use in the conduct of 
research.”25 
In the five months since the Supreme Court decided Merck, 
several courts have grappled with its impact on pending litigation. In 
Classen v. Biogen,26 a federal district court applied Merck to dismiss 
claims of patent infringement against drug manufacturers for 
conducting research on patented inventions.27 However, the 
broadened interpretation is not limitless. Decisions in the wake of 
Merck have required something more than “a remote desire to obtain 
FDA approval for products [as] sufficient to satisfy the ‘reasonably 
related standard.’”28 
Another criticism of the broad application of Section 271(e)(1) 
suggests that the majority did not give adequate attention to the 
“solely for uses reasonably related to submission under a Federal law” 
language contained in the text of Section 271(e)(1).29 For instance, the 
court in Third Wave Technologies, Inc. v. Stratagene30 focused on the 
word “solely” when it noted that partial desire to submit to the FDA 
was an insufficient ground for invocation of the Section 271(e)(1) 
exemption.31 
Merck not only broadened protection for drug manufacturers 
under Section 271(e)(1), it will likely also affect the law of research 
exemptions by providing decreased protection to holders of research 
tool patents. Although the Court in Merck expressly avoided the 
research-tool exemption issue, application of the safe-harbor 
provision to pre-clinical trials allows the provision to reach back much 
farther than the Federal Court’s interpretation of the exemption 
would have.32 
 
 25. Integra Lifesciences v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Newman, J. 
dissenting) corrected by 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 27796, *50 (July 10, 2003). 
 26. Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 381 F. Supp. 2d 452 (D. Md. 2005). 
 27. Id. at 455-56. 
 28. Third Wave Techs., Inc. v. Stratagene Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 891, 913 (D. Wis. 2005). 
 29. See Lawrence Ebert, One Response to Merck v. Integra, Sept. 25, 2005, available at 
http://madisonian.net/archives/2005/06/14/merck-v-integra/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2005) 
(“Although a strict constructionist, Justice Scalia did not analyze the word ‘solely’ in 271(e)(1). 
However, by allowing that the jury instruction in Merck v. Integra was not inconsistent with the 
Supreme Court decision, Justice Scalia generated a mechanism to re-introduce ‘solely.’”). 
 30. Third Wave Techs., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 2d at 913. 
 31. See id. (finding testimony from CEO that testing was “motivated ‘in part’ by a desire to 
obtain FDA approval” insufficient grounds to invoke protection under Section 271(e)(1)). 
 32. Merck, 125 S. Ct. at 2382 n.7. 
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One critic has even suggested that broadening of the statutory 
provision in Merck demonstrates favoritism towards the protection of 
research within the drug industry above other industries.33 In this 
regard, the statutory exception is a revitalization of research 
protection for drug manufacturers who lost the common law 
exception in Madey v. Duke University.34 In Madey, the Federal 
Circuit significantly narrowed the common-law experimental-use 
exemption to include only those acts that are “solely for amusement, 
to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical inquiry.”35 After 
Madey, if the infringer’s act can be said to be “in furtherance of the 
infringer’s legitimate business purpose,” the act is not protected under 
the common-law experimental-use exemption.36 
There is widespread agreement that the Supreme Court has made 
the status of research tool patents unclear.37 Practitioners agree that 
by avoiding the issue of a research tool patent exemption in Merck, 
the Court invited future litigation on the precise issue of whether 
271(e)(1) exempts use of patented research tools from patent 
infringement.38 Irving N. Feit, a patent specialist, has noted that use of 
the words “patented invention” and specific exclusion from protection 
of animal and veterinary products in Section 271(e)(1) suggests that 
there is no indication that the Court will treat research tool patents as 
a separate class of inventions.39 Although the Court’s decision in 
Merck leaves the door open for future litigation as to the precise 
impact Section 271(e)(1) will have on research exemptions, Merck 
 
 33. Garde, supra note 18, at 266 (“[B]roadening the statutory exemption while at the same 
time leaving the common-law experimental use exemption in its limited form suggests that only 
in the drug development industry is research more important than patent rights on other 
technologies, including, possibly even research tools.”). 
 34. Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 958 (2003); 
see also Joly, supra, note 22, at 3. 
 35. Madey, 307 F.3d at 1362. 
 36. Id. 
 37. See, e.g., Garde, supra note 18, at 262 (“By [‘failing to differentiate between 
experimenting on and experimenting with patented technology’] the availability of the 
exemption is now uncertain for research tools”); Crouch, supra note 22 (“Rather than settling 
the law the Court appears to have created an unfortunate uncertainty regarding the value of 
patents covering research tools.”); Irving N. Feit, The Safe Harbor Infringement Exemption 
Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, Finally Defined, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY TODAY, Aug. 2005, 
at 28, available at http://www.iptoday.com/pdf_current/Feit_Proof%203.pdf. (“It is not clear 
what effect the Supreme Court’s ambivalence will have on the strong endorsement of research 
tool patents made by the Federal Circuit’s Integra v. Merck decision.”). 
 38. See, e.g., Crouch, supra note 22; Feit, supra note 37, at 28. 
 39. Feit, supra note 37, at 28. 
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marks a commitment by the Court to a policy of broadening 
protection in drug research and development, even at a substantial 
cost to patent-holders. 
 
